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Abstract
Since 1995, more than 9,000 firms have delisted from U.S. stock markets, with
almost half of these being involuntary. This paper examines the law and eco-
nomics of the delisting process. We examine economic rationales for delisting,
the legal rules that define it, and the causes of delisting. Using a sample of New
York Stock Exchange firms delisted in 2002, we examine the effects of their
delisting and subsequent trading on the Pink Sheets. We find huge costs to
delisting, with percentage spreads tripling and volatility doubling but with vol-
ume being remarkably high. We also show that actual delisting times vary
considerably, with some firms trading for months after failing the listing re-
quirements. With exchanges transitioning to profit-seeking status, we argue that
the current delisting process also needs to change, and we suggest properties
of an optimal delisting rule and approaches to achieve it.
1. Introduction
Since 1995, more than 9,000 firms have delisted from U.S. stock exchanges and
markets. Some firms left voluntarily for reasons such as mergers, but almost half
of all delistings were involuntary, forced on companies by the very exchanges
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Pink Sheets, Inc., for providing us with data. We also
thank Sean Wang for research assistance and Edward Altman, Jim Angel, Ian Ayres, Dennis Carlton,
Ron Daniels, Simone Gervais, Oliver Hansch, Paul Mahoney, Roberta Romano, Peter Schuck, George
Sofianos, Peter Wallinson, Ingrid Werner, Eugene White, Carl Giangrasso (Pink Sheets), Shawn
Jenkins (American Stock Exchange), Frank Hathaway (National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation [NASDAQ]), Edward Knight (NASDAQ), Eric So (NASDAQ), Paul Bennett
(New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]), James F. Duffy (NYSE), Ed Kwalwasser (NYSE), Richard Ket-
chum (NYSE), and Dina Maher (NYSE) for their help with this paper. We have also greatly benefited
from the comments of an anonymous referee and from seminar and conference participants at the
University of California at Berkeley, Boston College, Carnegie-Mellon University, Cornell University,
New York University, Vanderbilt University, Yale Law School, the Financial Intermediation Research
Society meetings in Capri, and the National Bureau of Economic Research market microstructure
meetings.
684 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
and markets that had courted their listings. The practice of delisting stocks that
fail to meet the exchanges’ self-imposed continuing listing criteria is curious for
many reasons: it hurts the firms being delisted, it harms the investors holding
those shares, and it removes from the exchange or stock market a security that
traders wish to transact. Delisting also imposes costs on trading venues by de-
priving them of revenues from listing fees and commissions on transactions.
Given the far-reaching impact of delisting and the fact that the delisting decision
is generally left to the discretion of the listing venue, an analysis of this economic
process seems overdue.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the law and economics of the delisting
process. As exchanges and markets become profit-seeking corporate entities, the
issues of which firms should be allowed access to which markets and who should
decide when that access is curtailed take on particular relevance. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently weighed in with some technical
changes in delisting procedures, but we argue in this paper that a broader review
is in order.1 In particular, we suggest that the current delisting process is in-
herently flawed, with the few benefits from delisting generally accruing to the
(now profit-seeking) exchanges and the large costs being borne by firms and
their investors.
To develop our analysis, we outline the economic rationales offered for del-
isting and the various clienteles affected by the delisting decision. We then set
out the legal rules and procedures governing delisting on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation system (NASDAQ). Despite the seeming clarity of these rules, we
show that the actual process exhibits considerable variability, with some firms
trading for extensive periods (months to years) after failing particular require-
ments.
Using a sample of firms delisted from the NYSE in 2002, we then examine
the effects of delisting on the trading of these shares. The particular sample we
analyze includes well-known entities such as Enron, Global Crossing, Kmart,
and US Airways. What happens to the trading in such firms after delisting is
intriguing because, for a variety of reasons, most delisted NYSE firms end up
trading on the Pink Sheets, a trading venue that is little analyzed in the literature.
We obtained proprietary data from Pink Sheets, Inc., to examine the subsequent
trading of these stocks, which allowed us to analyze the specific effects of delisting
on firms and investors.2
1 In August 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to its
delisting rules intended “to reduce regulatory burdens on exchanges and issuers, and to make the
delisting and deregistration process more transparent and efficient in the interests of investors and
public” (Removal from Listing and Registration of Securities, Release No. 34-52029, 70 Fed. Reg.
42,456 [2005]). The amendments allow for electronic filing of required SEC notices and automatic
enactment of delisting applications after a specified period.
2 A limitation of our analysis is that these proprietary data were available only for 2002. While
recognizing the limitations this places on drawing general conclusions, we believe our results provide
ample evidence of the deleterious effects that accompany delisting from the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).
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Our research provides a number of contributions, a few of which we emphasize
here. First, our analysis quantifies the very real effects that accompany delisting.
We find that share prices fall by half, percentage spreads on average triple, and
volatility almost doubles when delisting occurs. While prices continue to decline
after delisting, volume remains remarkably high, with average first-day trading
in our sample of more than 2.25 million shares. Our results add to the interesting
literature (see Sanger and Peterson 1990; Shumway 1997; Shumway and Warther
1999) looking at the economic effects of delisting on portfolio return measure-
ment and investment decisions. Our particular focus on NYSE stocks comple-
ments a recent paper by Angel, Harris, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2004), who
find similar effects on liquidity and market quality surrounding the delisting of
NASDAQ stocks.
Second, our analysis provides interesting insights into the trading of nonlisted
securities.3 We find that, for at least some firms, different trading venues entail
very different effects on the price process. While small-firm trading appears to
deteriorate on the Pink Sheets relative to on the NYSE, large-firm trading is less
affected, with dollar spreads actually declining for large firms moving to the Pink
Sheets. Part of the explanation for this divergence is tick size. The NYSE min-
imum tick is 1 cent, while the Pink Sheets permits subpenny pricing. For actively
traded stocks with very low stock prices (an almost universal characteristic of
large delisting firms), this pricing grid difference can result in trading costs
actually being lower by some metrics on the electronic Pink Sheets venue than
on the floor-based NYSE.
Third, our analysis highlights a number of important policy issues relating to
the delisting and trading of faltering firms. We argue here that the current rules
are antiquated, forcing exchanges to remove firms for violating strictures of
dubious modern-day value. Moreover, the flexibility accorded exchanges in ef-
fectuating delistings is problematic, with some firms trading for months (or even
years) after violating the listing requirements and others being removed almost
immediately. As exchanges move to for-profit status, the incentives surrounding
the exchange’s decision to delist become ever more complex. We argue that the
current delisting process does not reflect the economic realities of these new
incentives. We propose an optimal delisting policy that takes into account the
various clienteles affected by delisting, and we discuss alternative approaches to
implement this policy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the economic rationale
and causes for delisting and the legal framework surrounding delisting on both
the NYSE and the NASDAQ. Section 3 then investigates the costs of delisting
3 The over-the-counter (OTC) market is composed primarily of the Over-the-Counter Bulletin
Board (OTCBB) and the Pink Sheets. Because the OTCBB is owned and operated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, it is subject to greater regulation and disclosure requirements than
are the Pink Sheets. An interesting paper looking at the impact of SEC disclosure regulations on
OTC firms is Bushee and Luez (2003). For details on the operation of the OTCBB, see also Angel
et al. (2004).
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for a sample of firms delisted from the NYSE in 2002. Our analysis here examines
the impact of delisting and moving to the Pink Sheets on spreads, volumes,
volatilities, and prices. Section 4 discusses the implications of our results for the
exchanges’ delisting decisions and the regulatory treatment of delisting.
2. The Law and Economics of Delisting
Delisting rules can be divided into two distinct categories. In the first category
are rules designed to insure that the exchange’s relationship with the listed
company remains profitable. It is costly for exchanges to continue to list firms
whose trading is sporadic. Moreover, it may be difficult for specialists or market
makers to profitably quote a two-sided market if such episodic volume is too
information driven. Because exchanges derive their livelihood from fees asso-
ciated with trading, it is sensible that trading not entail losses for the listing
venue.
A second category of delisting rules is designed to protect the trading venue’s
investment in reputational capital. Exchanges traditionally provide a vector of
services to investors and issuers, including standardized governance rules, mon-
itoring of trading, clearing and settlement, liquidity, and a signaling function.
Delisting rules allow the exchange to preserve the value of the reputational signal
associated with listing on that trading venue. Expelling errant firms also allows
the exchange to enforce the norms expected of listed firms. To the extent that
all firms whose shares are listed meet the exchange’s listing standards, investors
can rely on the integrity of the firms listed on the exchange.
Whether such signal-based rules are still sensible is debatable. Investors now
have myriad sources of information regarding a firm’s prospects, which suggests
less reliance on the listing venue. A second complicating factor is that where a
firm trades is often divorced from where a firm lists (see Macey and O’Hara
[2002] for discussion). These factors undermine the traditional investor protec-
tion argument for delisting, an issue we return to in Section 4. Similarly, the
deterrent role of delisting is also questionable. Despite the recent spate of cor-
porate scandals, few firms are actually delisted for aberrant behavior. The intense
competition between exchanges for listings is likely to contribute to this reticence
to delist.4
In the United States, virtually all firms list on one of three venues: the NYSE,
4 Indeed, the ability of firms to voluntarily delist and move to another venue has created a recurrent
problem for exchanges in enforcing their rules. Thus, the NYSE chose to abandon its rules against
dual-class shares in the face of General Motors’s and Dow Jones’s threats to move to the NASDAQ
(where such share structures were allowed). See also Baglole (2004) for a discussion of similar
problems at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
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the NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).5 The regional ex-
changes have the ability to list firms, but few do so actively. Just as listing criteria
differ among these venues, so too do delisting criteria. The legal requirements
that cover delisting are remarkably complex, even within the context of securities
laws generally. Adding to the complexity of the delisting rules is the significant
discretion that the trading markets have in their application of these rules.
2.1. The New York Stock Exchange
The NYSE sets out three numeric requirements for delisting and numerous
more subjective criteria. First, listed companies must meet minimum distribution
requirements for their shares. Specifically, the NYSE will consider delisting a
firm if the number of total stockholders drops below 400, if the number of
publicly held shares is less than 600,000, or if the average monthly trading volume
for the previous 12 months is less than 100,000 shares (NYSE, Listed Company
Manual [hereafter NYSE], sec. 802.01[A]).6 Second, the NYSE will consider
delisting if a company fails to meet certain market capitalization requirements
(NYSE, sec. 802.01[B]). These distribution and capitalization rules seem designed
to insure that there is continued trading volume and interest sufficient to justify
the costs to the NYSE of listing a stock.
Third, the NYSE will consider delisting if the average closing price of a security
is less than $1.00 over a consecutive 30-day trading period (NYSE, sec.
802.01[C]). If the minimum average closing price is the only criterion the com-
pany fails to meet, the NYSE will provide the company with up to 6 months to
cure the deficiency (NYSE, sec. 802.01[C]).7 If after 6 months the average closing
price remains below $1.00, the NYSE will begin standard delisting procedures
(NYSE, sec. 802.01[C]).
In addition, the NYSE will consider delisting if the company’s operating assets
have been substantially reduced in size or if the company files for bankruptcy
or announces its intention to file, “under any of the sections of the bankruptcy
law” (NYSE, sec. 802.01[D]). The NYSE will also consider delisting if (1) the
NYSE receives authoritative advice that the security is without value, (2) the
securities registration is no longer effective, (3) proxies are not solicited for all
meetings of stockholders, (4) the company violates its listing agreement, (5) an
5 Traditionally, firms have not listed on more than one venue, and the voluntary movement of
firms between listing venues has virtually always involved firms “graduating” from the NASDAQ or
American Stock Exchange to the NYSE (a recent exception here is Charles Schwab, which shifted
from the NYSE to the NASDAQ in 2005). This single-listing practice has recently been called into
question by NASDAQ’s offer to waive listing fees for Dow-Jones Index funds listed on the NYSE,
thus setting the stage for dual listing. In February 2004, Hewlett-Packard became the first firm to
officially list on both markets. For a discussion of listing issues, see Macey and O’Hara (2002).
6 The total number of stockholders can fall to 400, unless the average monthly trading volume
for the previous 12 months is less than 100,000 shares, in which case the total number of shareholders
must be 1,200.
7 The cure period may be extended to the date of the company’s next annual board meeting if
that is more than 6 months away.
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entire class, issue, or series of securities are retired through payment or re-
demption, or (6) the company engages in operations that, in the opinion of the
NYSE, are contrary to the public interest. Finally, the NYSE reserves the right
to “make an appraisal of, and determine on an individual basis, the suitability
for continued listing of an issue in the light of all pertinent facts whenever it
deems such action appropriate, even though a security meets or fails to meet
any enumerated criteria” (NYSE, sec. 802.01[D]).8
2.2. National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System
The NASDAQ’s delisting requirements have many of the same features as the
NYSE requirements. Specifically, NASDAQ will consider delisting if any of the
following minimum criteria are not met: (1) stockholder equity of $10 million,
(2) 750,000 shares publicly held, (3) market value of publicly held shares of at
least $5 million for 30 consecutive business days, (4) bid price not less than
$1.00 for 30 consecutive business days, (5) 400 shareholders of round lots, and
(6) at least two market makers for 10 consecutive business days (NASD Manual
[hereafter NASD], sec. 4450). In addition, NASDAQ may also delist if the com-
pany files or announces that the board has authorized liquidation under any
section of the bankruptcy laws (NASD, secs. 4450[a][1]–[6], 4450[e][1]–[3]).
Like the NYSE, the NASDAQ’s delisting criteria provide for considerable dis-
cretion: “Nasdaq may deny initial inclusion or apply additional or more stringent
criteria for the initial or continued inclusion of particular securities or suspend
or terminate the inclusion of particular securities based on any event, condition,
or circumstance which exists or occurs that makes initial or continued inclusion
of the securities in Nasdaq inadvisable or unwarranted in the opinion of Nasdaq,
even though the securities meet all enumerated criteria for initial or continued
inclusion in Nasdaq” (NASD, sec. 4300).
2.3. Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Both the NYSE and NASDAQ may also delist companies not in compliance
with their corporate governance listing standards. Delisting for noncompliance
with these standards, however, is uncommon; the exchanges tend to encourage
compliance through “negotiation with issuers” (Lang et al. 2002, p. 1491). For-
eign companies can even obtain waivers for these requirements if similar re-
quirements do not exist in the foreign state’s law (Lang et al. 2002, p. 1514). In
light of the recent corporate scandals, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ have
tightened their corporate governance listing standards. Whether such heightened
standards result in actual delistings remains to be seen.
8 An intriguing example of such discretionary delisting is the NYSE’s delisting on February 20,
1961, of five Cuban railroads and sugar companies following the expropriation of their assets by
Fidel Castro’s communist government.
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2.4. Trading after Delisting
A firm delisted from the NASDAQ stock market is available for immediate
quotation on the NASDAQ Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB), pro-
vided the firm is not in bankruptcy and is current in its financial reporting with
the SEC. There is also a formal requirement that market makers must have issued
price quotations in the security during the 30-day period preceding its removal.
In principle, this means that, while many delisting NASDAQ stocks automatically
begin trading on the OTCBB, firms delisted from the NYSE may face some delay
because their shares have not been quoted by a market maker during the previous
30 days.
Because the OTCBB is a quotation medium for subscribing members and not
an issuer listing service, a delisted NASDAQ or NYSE issuer cannot “list” them-
selves on the OTCBB. A delisted issuer must submit a request to the SEC and
contact prospective broker-dealer firms to request that these firms register to
quote their securities on the OTCBB. The SEC typically expedites the approval
process for NYSE firms.
Most stocks delisted from the NYSE and some stocks delisted from NASDAQ
move to the Pink Sheets, a trading system operated by the private firm Pink
Sheets, Inc..9 The origins of the Pink Sheets date to 1904, when the National
Quotation Bureau began as a paper-based, interdealer quotation service linking
competing market makers in OTC securities. The Pink Sheets is essentially an
electronic quotation system for market makers willing to trade in these shares,
and it currently quotes some 4,744 issues. There are no listing standards, and
the Pink Sheets does not regulate the market.10 This has led, in the past, to
concerns about the market’s fairness and opacity.
2.5. The Delisting Decision: Recent Evidence
Table 1 provides data on the total number of delistings from the NYSE, the
NASDAQ, and the AMEX for the period 1995–2005. The number of delistings
varied over the time period, peaking at 1,231 firms in 1999. Delistings have
decreased somewhat since, then but they are still substantial, with more than
500 firms delisting in 2005.
The delisting requirements discussed above allow exchanges to delist firms for
a wide range of reasons. In addition, voluntary delistings occur as the natural
consequence of a merger, a decision to take the firm private, a voluntary liquidation,
or a company’s decision to list only in its home market. Table 2 provides evidence
on the mix between voluntary and involuntary delistings. As is apparent, voluntary
delisting is much more prevalent on the NYSE than on the NASDAQ, but both
venues have a substantial number of involuntary, or regulatory, delistings.
9 The name “pink sheets” derives from the color of the paper on which stock prices for the firms
traded in this market are printed and distributed to traders. Currently, the screen on which quotes
and other market information, including the market makers’ phone numbers, are displayed is pink.
10 Specifically, under securities law, Pink Sheets is categorized as a securities information processor,
or SIP.
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Table 1
Delistings from U.S. Stock Exchanges and Markets, 1995–2005
Year NYSE NASDAQ AMEX Annual
2005 135 332 87 554
2004 134 322 73 529
2003 140 460 84 684
2002 145 569 80 794
2001 213 665 94 972
2000 286 475 111 872
1999 254 873 104 1,231
1998 209 769 101 1,079
1997 183 688 112 983
1996 105 557 87 749
1995 102 547 77 726
Total 1,906 6,257 1,010 9,273
Sources. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Facts and Figures (http://www.nyxdata
.com/factbook); National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ), DataStore (https://data.nasdaq.com); NASDAQ Web page (http://www
.nasdaq.com); American Stock Exchange (AMEX), Market Data Services (https://www
.amexdata.com/index.aspx?pgpMDOverview).
Note. Values are the number of firms delisting in each year from the NYSE, AMEX,
and the NASDAQ market. These numbers include both voluntary and involuntary
delistings.
We reviewed all involuntary-delisting announcements on the NYSE and the
NASDAQ for the period 1999–2004. Table 3 provides data on the causes for
regulatory delisting (the number of causes exceeds the total number of delisted
firms because of multiple reasons for delisting). Not surprisingly, bankruptcy is
an important cause for delisting on both markets, as is the failure to maintain
the minimum assets or market capitalization criteria. More intriguing is the
important role played by minimum share price requirement: failure to meet the
$1.00 share price is the most commonly cited cause of NASDAQ delisting, and
it is the second most common reason on the NYSE.
One might have conjectured that a firm whose share price drops below $1.00
could avoid delisting by means such as reverse stock splits, debt-reducing ex-
change offers, or even the potential sale of the company. Certainly, many com-
panies do pursue such strategies and occasionally avoid, or at least forestall,
delisting. For example, Nortel announced a reverse split in April 2003 specifically
to avoid being delisted by the NYSE, a strategy thus far successful.11 Yet Popmail
found its 1-for-10 reverse split in October 2000 ineffective in supporting its stock
price, leading to its delisting in January 2001 (Simon 2001). A similar fate befell
Oakwood Homes, whose 1-for-5 reverse split in June 2001 did not forestall its
2002 delisting by the NYSE.
11 Another successful example is 7-Eleven, the Dallas convenience store chain, which completed
a 1-for-5 reverse split in May 2000. The refinancing brought 7-Eleven’s share price up to $20.94 the
day of the split, from $4.19. Subsequently, the firm turned around its fortunes by reducing debt and
improving earnings. The split also had “an important psychological effect in raising 7-Eleven shares
above $10” (Elstein 2001).
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Table 2
Voluntary and Regulatory Delistings, 1998–2004
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
NYSE:
Voluntary 180 204 225 148 82 77 116
Regulatory 29 50 61 65 63 63 18
Total delistings 209 254 286 213 145 140 134
NASDAQ:
Voluntary 280 433 235 275 289 267 258
Regulatory 489 440 240 390 280 193 64
Total delistings 769 873 475 665 569 460 322
Sources. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Facts and Figures (http://www.nyxdata.com/factbook); Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ), DataStore (https://data
.nasdaq.com); NASDAQ Web page (http://www.nasdaq.com).
Note. Values are the total number of firms delisted from the NYSE and the NASDAQ market. Voluntary
delistings are those instigated by the firm and arise for reasons such as mergers or a firm’s decision to
move to another exchange or to go private. Regulatory delistings are instigated by the exchange or market
when a firm is in violation of the listing requirements.
The ineffectiveness of the reverse-split strategy is not surprising. Reverse stock
splits provide a very negative signal to the market.12 Hwang (1995) finds a
negative price drop of more than 9 percent in his analysis of reverse splits by
NASDAQ-listed firms, and similar negative effects are reported for reverse splits
on the NYSE and the AMEX (see Woolridge and Chambers 1983). Lie, Lie, and
McConnell (2001, p. 182) report a similar problem arising with debt-reducing
exchange offers (DREOs), noting their “results are consistent with the idea that
the information conveyed by an announcement of a DREO is that a firm’s future
prospects are even more bleak than would have been anticipated on the basis
of public information prior to the announcement.”
Thus, while some firms do succeed in raising their stock prices via such
extraordinary methods, the strategy’s rarity suggests that for many firms the costs
of doing so are simply too high. For those firms, involuntary delisting becomes
a reality. What happens to those firms that delist (and to their stockholders) is
less clear. In Section 3, we provide evidence on these issues by examining the
effects of delisting for a sample of firms involuntarily delisted from the NYSE.
3. From the New York Stock Exchange to the
Pink Sheets: The Impact of Delisting
3.1. Sample Firms
Investigating the impact of delisting requires data on firms’ trading before
and after their removal from the listing exchange. Unfortunately, trading data
12 Barry Siegel, chairman and chief executive of Driversshield.com made the point succinctly: “Make
no mistake, a reverse split is an act of desperation. It sends a terrible signal that management has tried
everything it knows to lift the stock price and nothing has worked” (Avid Trading Company, Avid
Traders Prior Tuesday Evening Chat [http://www.twinight.org/avid/2001/avidchat0619pm.html]).
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Table 3
Reasons Given for Regulatory Delisting, 1999–2004
Total 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
From NYSE:
Total 320 50 61 65 63 63 18
Price below minimum 139 6 28 46 43 11 5
Market cap below minimum 184 25 44 50 44 12 9
Bankruptcy, financial restructuring, or liquidation 86 13 19 19 22 8 5
Delinquent in SEC filings 12 3 1 3 1 1 3
Net tangible assets or net income below
minimum 21 21 0 0 0 0 0
Other 15 3 2 2 4 2 2
From NASDAQ:
Total 1,607 440 240 390 280 193 64
Bid price below minimum 771 257 97 218 109 83 7
Market capitalization below minimum 129 0 4 3 8 95 19
Bankruptcy or liquidation 229 31 36 79 48 19 16
Delinquent in filings 196 40 31 53 32 25 15
Net income below minimum 637 190 95 138 133 65 16
Insufficient public float 183 93 31 54 0 5 0
Public interest concern 167 28 29 71 17 13 9
Insufficient number of market makers 78 40 15 23 0 0 0
Other 194 57 26 34 11 56 10
Note. Regulatory delistings often are for violations of several standards, so the total number of causes
exceeds the total number of firms delisted in a given year. Data are from the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) delisting an-
nouncements. The Other category for NYSE delistings includes reasons such as accounting irregularities,
going-concern emphasis by auditors, and investigation of the company by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for misstatements. The Other category for NASDAQ delistings includes failure to
provide requested information, failure to comply with qualifications, failure to comply with corporate
governance requirements, and violations of reverse-merger requirements.
from venues such as the Pink Sheets (where most delisted NYSE firms trade)
have traditionally been unavailable. We were able to obtain a proprietary data
set from Pink Sheets, Inc., for all firms involuntarily delisted from the NYSE in
year 2002. While acknowledging the limitations of such a short sample period,
our sample does include a number of the most recognizable (and notorious)
delistings, including those of Enron, Global Crossing, US Airways, Kmart, and
Owens Corning. Our analysis is thus useful for illuminating the issues connected
with the postfailure trading of these prominent firms as well as what happens
to small, less well known companies.
In 2002, there were 63 forced delistings from the NYSE, with five firms moving
to the AMEX and the remaining 58 to the Pink Sheets.13 We restricted our sample
to those 58 firms moving to the Pink Sheets to avoid confounding effects arising
from different trading mechanisms. We collected data from Compustat on firms’
asset size (with two firms being deleted because of incomplete trading or asset
13 Of the sample firms moving to the Pink Sheets, 49 of 57 firms also end up trading on the
OTCBB. For some stocks, listing on the OTCBB is approximately concurrent with Pink Sheets listing,
but for other firms there is a delay. Interestingly, Enron did not trade on the OTCBB at any point
in 2002.
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value data). We obtained from Pink Sheets, Inc., daily data giving the closing
price, spread, and volume for each stock in our sample for the first 60 trading
days postdelisting. Predelisting data on these variables are taken from the Center
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). We also deleted one firm from the
sample because of the lack of trading activity.14 The final sample is 55 firms,
which are listed in Table 4.
An interesting feature of our sample is firm age: 33 firms had been trading
on the NYSE for 10 years or more before their delisting, with several representing
some of the oldest U.S. firms (Bethlehem Steel, for example, incorporated in
1906 but traces its origins to 1857, while Kmart had traded for 84 years on the
NYSE before its delisting). Only five of the delisted firms listed since 2000, and
three of these were actually spinoffs of larger firms trading on the NYSE.15 While
our sample includes a number of well-known established firms, it also includes
a number of lesser known entities such as Coastcast Corporation and Airlease,
Ltd.
The diversity in our sample suggests that delisting effects may vary across
firms, particularly if firm size is considered. Firm size data at the time of delisting
are apt to be misleading, so we consider as alternative proxies for firm size the
market capitalization as of January 2, 2001, and total assets as of January 1,
2001. Our sample firms all delist at some point in 2002, so these data predate
delisting by at least 12 months for each firm. The results with either size measure
were virtually the same, so we report results based on total assets. As shown in
Figure 1, total assets range from over $65 billion (Enron) to $38 million (Philips
International Realty Corp.). For the overall sample, 12 firms have total assets
above $5 billion, 20 firms range between $5 billion and $1 billion, and 23 firms
have total assets below $1 billion.
We also include in Table 4 the main explanations cited by the NYSE for each
firm’s delisting. Many firms violate multiple listing criteria, but the most cited
factors are share price below the minimum (39 firms) and market capitalization
below the minimum (37 firms). These two conditions are often, but not always,
congruent: 11 of the 37 firms delisted for market capitalization did not fail the
share price requirement. Bankruptcy led to the delisting of 19 firms in our sample,
with 16 of these firms also failing to meet the share price requirement.
Earlier we noted that the listing venues can exercise considerable discretion
14 An examination for outliers in our trade data revealed that one firm Panavision (PVI) had an
average dollar spread more than 50 percent higher than any other stock in our sample. Further
investigation found the stock to have the lowest NYSE volume (165 shares a day) and the lowest
daily Pink Sheets volume (953 shares a day) of any stock in the sample. Further, PVI had positive
volume on only 15 of the 60 days in our postdelisting period (for comparison, the stock with the
second highest spread traded on 57 of 60 days). To avoid spurious inferences, we deleted PVI from
the sample.
15 Recent studies of firm mortality (see, for example, Fama and French 2004) attribute increased
mortality rates to the influx of weaker firms coming to market in the late 1990s. Our sample includes
15 firms that listed between 1996 and 1999, but overall our sample includes a wide variety of firms.
The findings of Fama and French are more applicable to the NASDAQ market, where firm tenure
before delisting is shorter than on the NYSE.
Table 4
Sample Stocks Delisted from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 2002:














Enron Corporation 65,503 Yes Yes
Conseco 58,589 Yes Yes
Global Crossing 30,185 Yes Yes
NTL 28,384 Yes Yes
Kmart Corp. 14,630 Yes Yes
The FINOVA Group 12,089 Yes Yes Yes
Federal-Mogul Corporation 10,255 Yes Yes
US Airways Group 9,127 Yes
Comdisco 8,754 Yes Yes
Williams Communications Group 7,409 Yes Yes
Owens Corning 6,912 Yes Yes Yes
Bethlehem Steel Corporation 5,467 Yes Yes
Mutual Risk Management 4,860 Yes Yes
Budget Group 4,520 Yes Yes
Armstrong Holdings 3,875 Yes
Asia Global Crossing 3,633 Yes Yes
Kaiser Aluminum Corporation 3,343 Yes Yes Yes
Covanta Energy Corporation 3,295 Yes Yes
Encompass Services Corporation 2,700 Yes Yes
National Steel Corporation 2,565 Yes Yes
Exide Technologies 2,299 Yes Yes
The Alpine Group 2,094 Yes
Superior TeleCom 1,992 Yes Yes
Magellan Health Services 1,804 Yes Yes
Viasystems Group 1,611 Yes Yes
Polymer Group 1,508 Yes Yes Yes
EOTT Energy Partners 1,493 Yes Yes
GenTek 1,351 Yes
National Equipment Services 1,249 Yes Yes
APW 1,214 Yes Yes
Oakwood Homes Corporation 1,149 Yes Yes Yes
Key3Media Group 1,065 Yes
Acceptance Insurance Companies 964 Yes Yes
American Skiing Company 927 Yes Yes
Galey & Lord 896 Yes Yes
Cornerstone Propane Partners 851 Yes Yes Yes
Personnel Group of America 744 Yes Yes
Guilford Mills 724 Yes Yes
NewPower Holdings 712 Yes Yes
GAINSCO Inc. 475 Yes Yes
China Enterprises 402 Yes Yes
Atchison Casting Corporation 342 Yes Yes
LASER Mortgage Management 328 Yes
BNS Co. 251 Yes
Insteel Industries 245 Yes Yes
Asia Pacific Wire & Cable Corp. 187 Yes Yes
A.C.L.N. 140 Yes
PlanVista Corporation 116 Yes















Chart House Enterprises 108 Yes Yes
J Net Enterprises 105 Yes
Grubb & Ellis Company 103 Yes
Coastcast Corporation 99 Yes
Clarion Commercial Holdings 82 Yes
Airlease, Ltd 62 Yes
Philips International Realty Corp. 38 Yes Yes
Note. Data are for 55 firms that were delisted from the NYSE in 2002 and subsequently traded on Pink
Sheets. The Other category includes failed a merger arrangement (NewPower Holdings), planned liqui-
dations (LASER Mortgage Management and Philips International Realty), and NYSE concerns about the
adequacy of information disclosed by the company (A.C.L.N. Ltd. and Mutual Risk Management). Total
Assets is data item 6 on COMPUSTAT.
in the application of the delisting criteria. This is clearly shown in the data for
firms failing the minimum-price rule. The NYSE average share price rule allows
for delisting if the 30-day average share price falls below $1.00. For the 39 firms
delisted because of share price, we calculated the number of trading days prior
to the last day of trading on the NYSE that a stock was in violation of the 30-
day average price rule or the overall $1.00 rule.
Table 5 shows a wide disparity in violation times before firms were delisted.
Bethlehem Steel, for example, violated the 30-day rule for more than 7 months
(154 trading days), while Mutual Risk Management was delisted after only
1 day. Similarly, Acceptance Insurance Companies was removed after failing the
$1.00 requirement for 10 days, while Asia Pacific Wire & Cable Corp traded
below $1.00 for more than 215 days.
What can account for this disparity? One explanation is the cure period the
NYSE allows some firms to remediate the deficiency. This cannot be a complete
explanation, however, as some firms remained listed long after the maximum
6-month period, and it begs the question of how the NYSE determines the
particular cure period for a specific company in any case. An alternative expla-
nation is size; specifically, the exchange may be more likely to allow larger, more
active stocks to remain in violation. Using our cutoffs for small, medium, and
large size, however, we found no significant difference between the mean number
of days in violation for large stocks (49 days) or other stocks (47.75).
A similar discrepancy is exhibited by the 20 firms delisted because of bank-
ruptcy. Although NYSE rules allow for delisting of bankrupt firms, these rules
give the NYSE considerable leeway as to when or even whether to delist. For
example, Global Crossing was delisted on the day following its bankruptcy filing,
Enron was delisted after 30 trading days, and Owens Corning traded for more
than 2 years after its bankruptcy filing. For the firms in our sample, the average









































































Companies Delisted by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Because of Minimum






Enron Corporation 3 25
Conseco 0 12
Global Crossing 14 32
NTL 49 59
Kmart Corp. 121 120
The FINOVA Group 47 57
Federal-Mogul Corporation 31 45
Comdisco 140 63
Williams Communications Group 0 17
Owens Corning 23 11
Bethlehem Steel Corporation 154 163
Mutual Risk Management 1 17
Budget Group 81 92
Asia Global Crossing 21 34
Kaiser Aluminum Corporation 29 42
Covanta Energy Corporation 7 8
Encompass Services Corporation 73 88
Exide Technologies 7 24
Superior TeleCom 96 63
Magellan Health Services 19 40
Viasystems Group 91 104
Polymer Group 102 124
EOTT Energy Partners 0 2
National Equipment Services 29 40
APW 35 52
Oakwood Homes Corporation 9 29
Key3Media Group 25 41
Acceptance Insurance Companies 0 10
American Skiing Company 93 82
Galey & Lord 74 77
Cornerstone Propane Partners 6 17
Personnel Group of America 90 107
Guilford Mills 86 103
NewPower Holdings 62 78
GAINSCO Inc. 29 45
China Enterprises 29 35
Atchison Casting Corporation 17 33
Insteel Industries 83 84
Asia Pacific Wire & Cable Corp. 200 215
Chart House Enterprises 67 89
Note. Values are continuous trading days prior to the last day of trade on the NYSE that the company is
in violation of the share price rules. A stock violates the NYSE 30-day average price rule if its average daily
closing share price calculated over the preceding 30 days is below $1.00; 39 stocks were cited by the NYSE
for having violated the minimum price rule. Zeros indicate that the stock’s 30-day average share price
calculated on the date of last trade on NYSE was not less than $1.00.
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four of the 20 firms the NYSE delisted for bankruptcy never actually went
bankrupt; these firms were delisted after they announced the possibility of a
bankruptcy filing.
A complication in investigating the impact of delisting is that the timing
between delisting and subsequent trading on the Pink Sheets varies across the
sample firms.16 For example, for 20 firms, the NYSE delisting announcement
occurs on the last day of NYSE trading, while the other 34 firms continue to
trade on the NYSE for a few days following the announcement. Similarly, 27
firms begin trading the next day on the Pink Sheets, while the others face a
short hiatus before the resumption of trading (the average hiatus for this group
was 1.24 days). To enhance comparability, we define by the announcement date
of delisting. The opening date on Pink Sheets is the first day on which share
transactions occur. Thus, our analysis for Pink Sheets trading is comparable
across firms, but some firms may have interim trade data between the an-
nouncement date and Pink Sheets trading date that are not analyzed.
3.2. Pretty in Pink? Trading on the Pink Sheets
Table 6 provides data on the first day of Pink Sheets trading for the stocks in
our sample. Values for the full sample of 55 firms indicate that trading volume
is both large and variable on the opening day, ranging from 100 shares to more
than 53 million shares. The average volume is just over 2.59 million shares,
while the median volume equals 80,700 shares. Thus, while trading volume is
small for some firms, it is extremely large for others.
Part of the explanation for these large volumes is portfolio rebalancing, as the
investor clientele changes to reflect the unlisted status of these shares. Another
factor contributing to large volumes is the very low trading prices of the stocks.
Fully 75 percent of our sample is trading at prices below 50 cents, while 25
percent of the sample is below 10 cents. As the data show, the day 1 trade value
averages a little over $600,000 dollars, with the largest volume stock involving
only $16 million in trading value. This value of trading actually rises over the
first 5 days of trading and then gradually declines over the first 60 days of
trading.
The table also provides data for the three subsets of our sample. Again, the
data show large trading volumes, with the largest 12 stocks in the sample av-
eraging 10.3 million shares trading on opening day and the next largest 20 stocks
trading close to 900,000 shares.17 Median volumes are significantly lower, which
suggests a wide disparity across sample stocks. Our data suggest that, at least
for the largest stocks, significant trading activity occurs after delisting.
16 Shumway (1997) finds similar disparities in the delisting and subsequent trading of NYSE stocks.
He also notes that while some stocks’ delisting is preannounced by the company, this is not the case
for approximately two-thirds of his sample.
17 These smaller firm volume results are comparable in magnitude to the findings of Angel et al.
(2004), who report average trading volumes for 3 months following delisting of NASDAQ stocks of
approximately 133,000 shares per day.
Table 6
Trading on the Pink Sheets
Mean Median Min Max
Full sample:
Volume, day 1 2,593,724 80,700 100 53,341,600
Value of trade ($), day 1 619,422 11,250 65 16,269,188
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 5] 607,923 40,488 433 13,061,038
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 20] 358,428 40,199 244 7,235,380
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 60] 191,609 24,396 407 3,407,113
Percentage spread, day 1 39.32 23.53 .34 177.36
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 5] 25.62 13.92 .94 152.08
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 20] 18.29 12.23 .97 123.25
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 60] 15.31 11.25 .99 104.12
Largest 12 stocks:
Volume, day 1 10,337,333 2,568,400 325,500 53,341,600
Value of trade ($), day 1 2,646,220 929,403 119,214 16,269,188
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 5] 2,498,654 1,567,600 171,258 13,061,038
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 20] 1,447,900 994,125 127,274 7,235,380
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 60] 744,584 507,956 98,784 3,407,113
Percentage spread, day 1 4.02 2.93 .34 14.29
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 5] 3.34 2.58 .94 6.96
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 20] 3.36 2.55 .97 7.25
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 60] 3.84 3.09 .99 6.96
Middle 20 stocks:
Volume, day 1 868,445 220,850 100 6,131,800
Value of trade ($), day 1 77,583 17,843 65 655,512
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 5] 105,660 45,878 433 432,113
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 20] 79,901 53,368 1,108 277,105
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 60] 58,142 29,303 1,520 230,510
Percentage spread, day 1 46.75 41.21 3.77 133.33
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 5] 24.55 16.25 4.21 70.77
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 20] 16.59 13.42 3.75 50.14
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 60] 13.85 13.60 3.94 32.14
Smallest 23 stocks:
Volume, day 1 53,822 10,000 200 386,000
Value of trade ($), day 1 33,126 3,000 225 617,600
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 5] 58,205 11,759 434 714,901
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 20] 32,205 10,322 244 376,260
Mean daily value of trade, days [1, 60] 19,158 7,772 407 159,900
Percentage spread, day 1 51.28 28.57 8.33 177.36
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 5] 38.18 24.76 8.25 152.08
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 20] 27.56 15.67 5.63 123.25
Mean percentage spread, days [1, 60] 22.57 15.80 3.57 104.12
Note. Values are summary trading data from Pink Sheets for stocks that were delisted from the New York
Stock Exchange in 2002 and subsequently traded on Pink Sheets. The full sample of 55 stocks is divided
into three subsamples on the basis of total assets at fiscal year end 2000. Volume refers to the number of
shares traded. Day 1 refers to the first day of trade on Pink Sheets. Day [1, t] denotes the first t days of
trade on Pink Sheets. Value of trade is defined as volume # closing share price. Percentage spreads are
calculated as (closing ask price closing bid price)/(midpoint of closing ask and bid prices) # 100. Mean
daily value of trade, days [1, t], for instance, is the mean over time of the daily value of trade from day 1
through to day t.
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Trading costs are also very large, as evidenced by the average first-day per-
centage spread of almost 40 percent and the median spread of more than 23
percent. These first-day spreads appear to be quite volatile, which suggests that
median first-week spreads might give a better indication of trading costs. Here
we find a median spread of 13.92 percent for the overall sample. These median
spreads remain relatively stable over the first 60 days of trading and decline to
an average of 11.25 percent for the 3-month period. Regardless of the period
considered, the data suggest that investors face substantial costs in trading stocks
moving from the NYSE to the Pink Sheets.
Examination of the three subsamples, however, suggests that these costs are
very different for traders of the largest stocks. For the 12 largest stocks, first-
day median spreads are just 2.93 percent, and these spreads remain relatively
constant (3.09 percent) when measured over the first 60 days of trading. By
comparison, the 60-day median spread for the middle 20 stocks is 13.60 percent,
and it is 15.80 percent for the smallest 23 stocks in the sample.
An interesting question is how these new entrants to the Pink Sheets fare in
terms of return to their investors. Unfortunately, the very low prices of many
of the sample stocks greatly complicate determining such returns and render
standard analyses (such as measures of cumulative abnormal return) unreliable.18
We calculated market adjusted returns for our entire portfolio of stocks using
the midpoint of bid-and-ask prices over the first 60 days of trading on the Pink
Sheets. Overall, the portfolio value was approximately 10.29 percent lower by
the end of the period. Adjusting these returns for the large spreads that investors
incur only underscores that investors do not fare well when stocks hit the Pink
Sheets after delisting. Such a finding accords well with that of Campbell, Hilscher,
and Szilagyi (2007), who find similarly dismal performance of distressed stocks.
3.3. The Impact of Delisting: Before and after Comparisons
The data show that traders face substantial liquidity costs once stocks begin
trading on the Pink Sheets. What is not clear, however, is whether these costs
are any greater than those accompanying trading on the NYSE before delisting.
A related question is how the delisting decision, per se, affects the overall price,
volume, and trading behavior of the stock. We gathered data for the 60-day
predelisting period for each stock in our sample from the NYSE’s Trade and
Quote database and CRSP. Tables 7, 8, and 9 summarize these data for prices,
volumes, spreads, and volatility.19
18 For example, with a stock price at $.03 daily returns of 400 or even 600 percent arise, which
causes our overall return figures to be largely driven by outliers. Bid-ask bounce is also a concern,
because with a 40 percent spread, trades bouncing between the bid and ask will appear to generate
a return of more than 25 percent, even with stable quotes. This problem can be ameliorated by
measuring returns using quote midpoints instead of closing prices.
19 We report t-statistics to provide a measure of the statistical significance of our results. For the
120-day pre/postsample, there are clearly sufficient data to make these measures meaningful. For the
10-day pre/postsample, the validity of the t-statistics is less apparent. Thus we report nonparametric
Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for the 10-day sample. The results using the Kruskal-Wallace tests are
the same as those using t-statistics, which suggests that the effects are sufficiently large and robust.
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Table 7
Average Share Price ($) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)







Full sample (N p 55) .94 .48
Largest 12 stocks .62 .28
Stocks of bankrupt firms (N p 20) .69 .27
Stocks of nonbankrupt firms (N p 35) 1.09 .59
Stocks of firms violating price rules (N p 29) .41 .25
Stocks of firms not violating price rules (N p 26) 1.53 .74
Note. Values are for the day before the NYSE delisting announcement date and on the first day
of trade on Pink Sheets. Firms violating price rules had a stock price below $1.00 for a continuous
period of more than 30 days prior to being delisted from the NYSE. Average share price is calculated
as an equally weighted average of the share prices in the sample.
Perhaps the most immediate impact of the delisting announcement is on price.
As Table 7 shows, on the last day of NYSE trading, the average stock in our
sample closed at a price of $.94; on the first day of Pink Sheets trading, the
average stock closed at $.48. For large stocks, the divergence is even higher, with
prices dropping from $.62 to $.28. Focusing only on stocks not delisted for
bankruptcy, we find a decrease in price from $1.09 to $.59.20 The size and
magnitude of these effects suggest that delisting was a traumatic event for the
stock and its investors.
An interesting question is how much of this price decrease is due to being
removed from the NYSE and how much is due to the bad news regarding the
firm’s future prospects that is causing the firm’s delisting? One way to sort out
these effects is to consider the price behavior of firms delisted only after they
had visibly failed the delisting criteria for a substantial time. For such stocks,
the economic impact of the bad news was likely impounded into the price before
the delisting event. We formed a subsample of 29 stocks that were delisted 30
or more days after their stock prices had traded continuously below $1.00. For
these stocks, prices fell from $.41 to $.25, or approximately 40 percent. Con-
versely, the price decrease for the 26 stocks delisted for other reasons was ap-
proximately 52 percent (prices fell from $1.53 to $.74), which suggests that a
large part of the decline in price is indeed due to the loss of trading venue.
The deleterious effects of delisting are even more evident from spread data
given in Figure 2. For the entire sample, average percentage spreads increased
from 5.84 percent in the preperiod to 15.31 percent in the postperiod. This
increase is far greater than the 51 percent increase in spreads reported by Angel
et al. (2004) for NASDAQ stocks, a consequence perhaps of the lower spreads
on the NYSE prior to delisting. These data suggest that delisting from the NYSE
20 For the sample of bankrupt firms, the decline is from .70 to .28. Recall that the average firm
in this sample filed for bankruptcy more than 100 days before its delisting.
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Table 8




Days [1, 60] t-Statistic p-Value
Full sample (N p 55):
Mean dollar spread .0542 .0706 5.226 .0001
Mean percentage spread 5.84 15.31 17.452 .0001
Mean daily volume 2,038,849 1,064,695 4.992 .0001
Mean volatility, closing prices .1026 .1940 4.731 .0001
Mean volatility, bid prices .1057 .1532 2.913 .0048
Largest 12 stocks:
Mean dollar spread .0240 .0074 26.670 .0001
Mean percentage spread 2.97 3.84 5.752 .0001
Mean daily volume 8,479,348 4,142,160 4.993 .0001
Stocks of bankrupt firms (N p 20):
Mean dollar spread .0335 .0168 12.010 .0001
Mean percentage spread 3.50 8.50 15.570 .0001
Mean daily volume 5,205,142 2,442,864 5.298 .0001
Stocks of nonbankrupt firms
(N p 35):
Mean dollar spread .0660 .1013 7.937 .0001
Mean percentage spread 7.18 19.21 16.65 .0001
Mean daily volume 229,540 277,170 1.701 .0930
Note. Dollar spreads are defined as (closing ask price  closing bid price). Percentage spreads
are calculated as (closing ask price  closing bid price)/(midpoint of closing ask and bid prices)
#100. Volatility for a given day is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of the 55
stocks in the sample. Volume refers to the number of shares traded. Difference-of-means tests
are two-sided tests and assume unequal variances. NYSE p New York Stock Exchange.
may have greater consequences for transactions costs than delisting from
NASDAQ. Focusing on 5-day windows before and after delisting, we find that
spreads widen from 7.36 percent to a stunning 25.62 percent.
Intriguingly, the percentage spread for the 12 largest stocks has a different
pattern. While spreads rise in the 60-day pre- and postwindow (from 2.97 to
3.84 percent), they decline when measured in the 5-day pre- and postdelisting
period, decreasing from 4.947 percent during the last week of trading on the
NYSE to 3.33 percent during the first week of Pink Sheets trading, a statistically
significant drop. Figure 3 provides the corresponding average dollar spread data
for the sample. For the sample as a whole, the average dollar spread increases
from .054 to .070 in the 60-day intervals and from .049 to .1047 in the 5-day
intervals. For large stocks, however, this spread declines from .0254 to .0074
when measured across the combined 120-day interval, and it drops from .0258
to .010 when measured across the combined 10-day interval. That average dollar
spreads are lower on the Pink Sheets than they were on the NYSE for these large
stocks is an intriguing, and unexpected, finding.
To investigate this result further, we plotted in Figure 4 the average dollar
spread and average stock price over the 120 trading days for the large-firm sample.
The figure shows the dramatic price decline preceding the stock’s delisting and
the large increase in dollar spreads in the week before NYSE delisting. What
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Table 9







Full sample (N p 55):
Mean dollar spread .0490 .1047 6.8182 .009
Mean percentage spread 7.36 25.62 6.8182 .009
Mean daily volume 1,844,747 2,888,402 5.7709 .0163
Mean volatility, closing prices .1231 .3844 6.8182 .009
Mean volatility, bid prices .1237 .3525 6.8182 .009
Largest 12 stocks:
Mean dollar spread .0258 .0100 6.8182 .009
Mean percentage spread 4.947 3.3391 6.8182 .009
Mean daily volume 7,581,085 11,336,115 3.1527 .0758
Note. Dollar spreads are defined as (closing ask price  closing bid price). Percentage spreads are
calculated as (closing ask price  closing bid price)/(midpoint of closing ask and bid prices) #100.
Volatility for a given day is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns of the 55 stocks in the
sample. Volume refers to the number of shares traded. Kruskal-Wallis test statistics and their associated
p-values are based on a x2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. NYSE p New York Stock Exchange.
remains a puzzle are the spreads on the NYSE in the overall predelisting period.
Here we find that despite the large decline in price, spreads remain virtually
constant at around .02 per share and decrease only when trading begins on the
Pink Sheets.
One conjecture for this behavior is that the spreads reflect a higher fixed cost
of market making on the NYSE. A basic insight in market microstructure models
(see O’Hara 1995) is that bid-ask spreads generally decrease as trading volume
increases and increase as price volatility increases. Figure 5 and 6 clearly show
that volume decreases when stocks move to the Pink Sheets, and volatility more
than doubles for the sample as a whole. (The first volatility estimate for Pink
Sheets trading in Figure 6 is on day 2.) Thus, the anomalous NYSE spread
behavior is not explained by natural properties of the order flow, as the volume
and volatility effects would be expected to increase, not decrease, dollar spreads.
These findings suggest two things about the NYSE trading environment. First,
the data show the important role played by the penny pricing increment at the
NYSE. The NYSE does not permit price quotes at the subpenny level, dictating
that spreads also cannot be less than 1 cent. The Pink Sheets allows subpenny
pricing, and the dramatic drop in spreads for the largest stocks to approximately
one-half cent reflects this greater price flexibility.21 Second, the data suggest that
the NYSE specialist’s “affirmative obligation” to maintain a high-quality, contin-
uous two-sided market for listed stocks actually does cause specialists to behave
21 Taking Enron as an example, in the 60-day period before its delisting, there is never a subpenny
quote and spreads fluctuate between 1 and 2 cents. On moving to the Pink Sheets, spreads in the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Stock Market Delisting 709
differently than they would in the absence of such obligations.22 The dramatic
deterioration of liquidity for the smaller, less traded stocks in our sample is con-
sistent with a cross-subsidization effect in which stocks with higher trading volumes
subsidize stocks that trade relatively infrequently. Huang and Liu (2003) dem-
onstrate similar subsidization behavior using data from individual specialist firms.
Turning to the volume and volatility data, we find that the distribution of
volume is relatively stable in the period before and after delisting, with the
exception of a spike approximately 30 days prior to delisting. This spike is largely
due to Enron’s bankruptcy filing. Overall, volumes increase when stocks move
to the Pink Sheets, possibly because of portfolio rebalancing of institutional
investors unable to retain unlisted securities in their portfolios. Volatility increases
dramatically, with closing price volatility more than twice as high and volatility
measured from closing bid prices on the order of 50 percent higher (.1063 to
.1540).23
One final issue we consider is the differential behavior of firms delisted because
of bankruptcy. Table 8 gives the relevant data for 60 days pre- and postdelisting
for the stocks of 20 delisted bankrupt firms and the 35 delisted nonbankrupt
firms. Overall, percentage spreads double for bankrupt firms moving to the Pink
Sheets, but their dollar spreads actually improve with the move. Conversely,
trading costs for the nonbankrupt stocks deteriorate no matter how they are
measured. We can strongly reject the hypothesis (t-statisti ,c p 2.543 p p
) that the two populations are the same..0155
Perhaps more intriguing are the volume effects, with trade executions for
stocks of the bankrupt firms declining from more than 5 million shares a day
to just over 2 million shares a day on the Pink Sheets. Conversely, volume is
little affected for the nonbankrupt firms, with no statistically significant difference
in trading before and after delisting. One explanation for these divergent effects
is simply size. As shown in Table 4, the bankrupt firms include a preponderance
of the largest firms in our sample, and comparison of the bankrupt and large-
firm samples in Tables 7, 8, and 9 reveals very similar behavior.
4. The Delisting Dilemmas: Why, When, and by Whom?
Overall, the data provide compelling evidence that involuntary delisting from
the NYSE is detrimental for firms and their investors. What is less easily deter-
22 Specialists are expected to stabilize stock price movements by buying for and selling from their
dealer accounts against the prevailing trend of the market, that is, to purchase on minus and zero
minus ticks and sell on plus and zero plus ticks. The NYSE currently uses several programs to measure
specialist performance, including (1) specialist capital utilization, which focuses on a specialist unit’s
use of its own capital in relation to the total dollar volume of trading activity in the unit’s stocks,
(2) the so-called near-neighbor approach, which compares the performance in a stock over rolling
3-month periods with the performance of stocks with similar trading characteristics, and (3) the
standards of acceptable performance specified in Rule 103A.
23 Closing trade prices are subject to bid-ask bounce. Measuring volatility by spread midpoints
results in an increase from .1010 to .1445.
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mined are the benefits that arise from delisting companies or even to whom
such benefits would accrue. In this section, we turn to the economic policy issues
surrounding delisting by considering the features of an optimal delisting regime
and how it could be implemented. Our goal is to suggest how delisting policies
should change to reflect the realities of both modern markets and the new world
of corporate exchange incentives.
As a starting point, consider the parties affected by any delisting policy. As
noted earlier, exchanges are affected through revenue effects (positive because
small, infrequently traded issues are expensive to trade and negative because of
lost trading and revenue opportunities) as well as reputation effects that may
attach to trading errant companies. Issuers are affected because delisting reduces
the liquidity of their stock and thereby influences their cost of capital. Current
investors are affected because delisting affects the liquidity of their investment
and influences the information environment surrounding the stock. Prospective
investors are affected because delisting may provide protection from fraud and
assure investors of firm quality.
An optimal delisting policy, therefore, should provide optimal liquidity for a
stock consistent with the exchange’s interest of making, or at least not losing,
money while protecting both current and future investors in the company.24 Such
a policy would allow an omniscient social planner to balance the complex costs
and benefits attaching to delisting. Unfortunately, implementing this optimal
policy in actual markets is problematic, requiring us to consider not only the
“why” of delisting, but also the “when” and “by whom” dimensions as well.
Certainly, the simplest approach is never to delist any company. This has the
advantages of providing liquidity to firms and their investors and allowing ex-
changes to continue to earn trading revenues, but it could also adversely affect
both exchanges and investors. Allowing the continued trading of companies that
are engaging in fraud, for example, harms potential investors and exchange
reputation (as well as the broader reputation of the U.S. capital markets). Trading
faltering firms can have similar negative effects on investors. Campbell, Hilscher,
and Szilagyi (2007) argue that since 1981, financially distressed stocks have de-
livered anomalously low returns, with investors apparently underestimating the
risk attaching to such stocks. Removing the current policy of delisting bankrupt
and near-bankrupt companies could only add to this difficulty.
Alternatively, the delisting decision could be left to the discretion of the ex-
changes, which essentially transfers the delisting problem to the market to solve.
This approach protects the exchanges’ interests, but it has several major draw-
backs. One problem is that because exchanges make money from volume, they
may be loathe to delist large firms, even in the presence of egregious behavior.
Certainly, the exchange’s failure to delist any of the more notorious corporate
24 Note that an exchange’s interest in long-term profits may depend on its reputation, so this
policy includes both the revenue and reputation considerations discussed above. One might also
include considerations such as protecting the long-run integrity of the U.S. capital markets.
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miscreants (Enron, WorldComm, and so on) before their problems became
public is not encouraging. And various exchanges (the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change in particular) have been accused of perpetuating a race to the bottom
in regulatory standards by lowering both listing and delisting standards. Fama
and French (2004) argue that the lowering of listing standards is one explanation
for the recent sharp increase in firm mortality, as lower quality firms were allowed
access to the capital markets. Delisting such lower quality firms is one way for
exchanges to remove such listing “mistakes,” but it does so by shifting the costs
of exchanges’ poor decision making to investors.
Moreover, the unwillingness of exchanges to enforce even their own delisting
rules raises concerns about the incentives of these now-corporate entities. Such
a situation arose in the summer of 2002 following the collapse of the dot-com
bubble, when as many as 10 percent of all NASDAQ stocks were failing the
minimum $1.00 share price requirement (Lucchetti 2003). NASDAQ’s reluctance
to delist these stocks is understandable given the revenue impact, but it does
raise questions as to whether exchange delisting policies are sustainable in a
competitive environment. A recent case in point is NYSE’s continued trading
of Fannie Mae.25 Fannie Mae did not file financial statements in 2004 and 2005
and, indeed, declared that its financial statements since 2001 “should no longer
be relied upon” (Beller 2005), meaning that there were no reliable data for Fannie
Mae for a 6-year period.26 New York Stock Exchange rules are clear that a
company cannot be listed on the NYSE without current financial statements.
However, Fannie Mae has not been delisted, and the NYSE has indicated on its
Web site that it will continue to allow Fannie Mae stock to trade indefinitely.
This forebearance policy has elicited intense criticism of the NYSE from the U.S.
Congress.
A third alternative for handling delisting is to transfer responsibility to a
regulatory body. Such an approach has been adopted in London, where the
Financial Services Authority has taken over the listing and delisting functions
from the London Stock Exchange. A similar situation is found in Germany and
Sweden, where delisting on the Deutsche Bourse and OM Exchange, respectively,
is handled by the regulator. However, in the United States the SEC has not
expressed a desire to expand its regulatory purview, which reflects perhaps a
general reluctance in the United States to transfer to government that which can
be, or at least has been, done by the private sector.27
How then to change the delisting process in the United States? We suggest
two precepts to guide the process. First, delisting is necessary in some cases.
Firms engaging in fraud or illegal activity must be removed from the capital
markets. Investors also rely on exchanges to remove firms that are of dubious
25 We thank Peter Wallison for suggesting this example to us.
26 For more details, see Wall Street Journal (2006). Fannie Mae did release its 2005 annual report
on May 2, 2007, but it does not expect to release 2006 numbers until possibly 2008. It has yet to
file required quarterly SEC reports.
27 See Macey and O’Hara (2005) for a discussion of self-regulation with profit-seeking exchanges.
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value, particularly when those firms are small and have little other publicly
available information. Agreeing to these two principles would provide a basic
framework as to why firms must be delisted. Second, the delisting decision cannot
simply be left to the discretion of exchanges. The incentives of exchanges are
not congruent with those of all the constituencies affected by delisting. The SEC
would seem to be in the best position to determine when firms are in violation,
but this could also be done via a shared responsibility between the SEC and the
exchanges.
The Canadian market illustrates how such an approach would work. The
Canadian regulatory body, Market Regulatory Services, has adopted the Universal
Market Integrity Rules, which apply to the trading of all Canadian stocks. These
rules include antifraud provisions as well as requirements to provide sufficient
information to allow investors to make informed decisions. Firms violating these
rules must be immediately delisted. Exchanges are free to apply additional rules
beyond these if they desire.
Applying such a framework here would suggest some immediate changes.
Delisting stocks for falling below some arbitrary price level, for example, would
no longer be required. The $1.00 price rule seems to us both outdated and
ineffective, but unfortunately it is not harmless, and change here seems long
overdue.28 Similarly, market capitalization requirements would also no longer be
grounds for delisting, although exchanges could adopt continuing listing fee
schedules based on market capitalization to recoup the higher costs of providing
markets for very small firms. Arguably, market competition between exchanges
would keep such fee schedules from being exploitative.
Some bankrupt and faltering firms would face delisting, but only those for
whom there is insufficient information available for investors to gauge their
potential viability. In practice, this would translate into large bankrupt firms
continuing to trade, while small bankrupt firms would be delisted. This principle
of having sufficient sources of information to evaluate the firm, for example,
would allow firms such as Fannie Mae to continue trading even though delin-
quent in SEC filings.
Delisting is a traumatic event for both firms and shareholders alike. As we
have shown, current delisting practices are questionable, but the deleterious
effects are not. The SEC is currently considering a number of trading practices
in the U.S. markets, including the dual listing of stocks, the self-regulation of
markets, and the corporate governance of exchanges. We suggest that the delisting
of stocks is another area where greater policy analysis is needed.
28 The regulatory odds are stacked heavily against firms as their share price drops below the
thresholds of $5.00 and $1.00 per share. The SEC has especially strict suitability rules designed to
discourage inexperienced investors from buying so-called penny stocks, whose price is below $1.00
per share. Brokerage firms typically do not follow penny stocks. For example, at Merrill Lynch,
brokers are prohibited from recommending shares that are not rated by the firm’s research analysts,
and analysts generally do not rate penny stocks. Even Internet message boards discourage discussions
related to penny stocks. For example, the Motley Fool does not allow discussion of stocks unless
they have traded over $5 per share for the past 30 consecutive days.
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